Derrida suggests in his late essay Poetics and Politics of Witnessing that bearing witness shouldn’t primarily consist in proving, in confirming data, in guaranteeing a theoretical certitude, a determinant judgement. It could probably solely attraction to an act of faith (Derrida, 2005:191). “Bearing witness, if there’s such an element” (191), he argues, is event-like in nature, at root a pledge or a promise that one factor occurred to me and sooner than me. The for me of witnessing is thus not privative in selection nonetheless precisely the important thing provide of a provocation and of a spot in direction of others- “secret” proper right here signifying the inaccessible singularity (nonetheless not indivisibility) of the witness, and of the second of witnessing. “For me as a minimum” marks the irreducible distinction between the witness and people who find themselves known as upon to witness witnessing. To hearken to his or her testimony, which is to say these which can be summoned to witness one factor to which, precisely, they can not testify, particularly that which appeared to the other (witness) as completely different. Witnesses to witnessing cannot be found, not as such, nonetheless his interdiction in no way prohibits witnesses from witnessing: as Derrida says, the “prohibition imposed on bearing witness” occurs “inside the very place the place one has to go on attention-grabbing to it”. (201).
All witnessing assumes as part of its development that the addressee of the witness will not ever see what was as quickly as present to the witness. The addressee, the third, has no fast entry to what was witnessed. In reality, the witness simply is not present to what he or she recollects each; all he or she can do is attest now to his or her having-been-present. So the voice asks you to believe-“Take into account me because of I inform you to, because of I ask it of you”-but to think about isn’t to subscribe to the conclusion of a syllogism. An affidavit is a pledge of sworn faith, however “You have to think about me” cannot be taken as a convincing demonstration. Derrida argues that witnessing appeals to the act of faith, which is always open to betrayal, infidelity and perjury. If perjury or false oaths weren’t on the coronary coronary heart of all witnessing-and there ought to always be the prospect of perjury-there could possibly be no testimony.
Derrida argues that “all accountable witnessing engages a poetic experience of language” (181).What’s that this poetic experience of language? For Derrida, it is the way that a testimony every reveals and conceals itself by way of the act of testimony. In a poem, notably the work of Celan, it is the “threat of a secret” which helps create the poetic experience. This threat of the important thing, for Derrida, is the potential of the lie or perjury. Nonetheless, on this essay, the potential of the lie is part of the poetic experience of language. All statements are in all probability testimony, inside the sense that they are uttered with the intent to be believed, with the implicit air of truth. The potential for the lie, which shall be recognized solely by the witness and by no means by the listener, is what marks the speech as testimony. The listener is always inside the place of attending to think about (or not) the testimony; it will probably’t be taken as “proof” or proof. Derrida Protests all by way of his essay that testimony simply is not proof. An affidavit that is certifiable proof isn’t testimony. Together with the potential of the lie, there’s the possibility that the witness is offering an untrue testimony in good faith. In his dialogue of Plato and his exams in Dissemination, Derrida confirms that morality, truth, memory and dialects are the central domains of writing.  The witness might need a faulty memory or notion of the event. This does not make the testimony false, nonetheless it is going to enhance the poetic experience or “threat of secrets and techniques and strategies” of the testimony.
One different part of this poetic experience is untranslatability. Poems are notoriously troublesome to translate, because of a variety of meanings and the “possibilit[ies] of secrets and techniques and strategies” which they comprise. As Derrida displays, testimony itself-both the phrase “testimony” and the act of witnessing” is untranslatable between languages. It moreover turns into, in a approach, an untranslatable experience. The witness relates a certain bodily, sensory experience, which should be (imperfectly) translated by language. The listener cannot instantly experience the event to which the witness testifies, so he or she ought to receive the interpretation of it in phrases. This situation of translation is part of the poetic experience of testimony. Seen or mathematical proof needs no translation-it is the non-proof of testimony that must be translated. The pitfalls of translation comprise or obscure the a variety of meanings, the possibilities of secrets and techniques and strategies that Derrida hyperlinks to the poetic experience.
In dialogue of aesthetics and emblematic of literary criticism associated to the Holocaust is an announcement made by German social-cultural critic Theodor W. Adorno, “to jot down poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” (Wu,1981, 34).  This well-known however controversial assertion is often taken out of the distinctive context. On the ground, the remark seems to advocate that poetry-writing must be suspended or stopped altogether after the Holocaust. Adorno’s assertion is invoked every to assist and to refute arguments regarding the appropriateness of literary representations of the Holocaust and scholarly analysis about them. The larger context of his writing reveals this assertion a lot much less as a categorical dictum in direction of Holocaust literature than as an indication of a far-ranging catastrophe of illustration, custom, ethics, philosophical applications, and knowledge after the holocaust. Adorno amplifies, “I do not want to soften my assertion that it is barbaric to proceed to jot down poetry after Auschwitz’s;…..literature ought to resist precisely this verdict, that’s, be such that it does not give as much as cynicism merely by current after Auschwitz” (1992:87-Eight). Similar to the central paradox that runs by rather a lot Holocaust literature- speaking the unspeakable, representing the unrepresentable- Adorno argues for a weighty literature that engages embattles cultural and ethical factors whereas acknowledging that the Holocaust may render such a literature unattainable. 
Derrida’s “poetics and politics of witnessing” seems every most eager to exorcise and most weak to calling once more into life as he engages Paul Celan’s poem and its undecidably singular and exemplary textual content material of witness/ing. Celan’s poem, or as a minimum these components of it Derrida cites, is, as a result of it emerges, a nearly ideally suited doc from which Derrida can derive his poetics, primarily as a result of tensions it sustains between the nominative particularity of its title (Aschenglorie”) and the departicularised abstractions of the traces that fall beneath that title and switch it farther from its apparent occasion of naming and deal with. A poem that seems concurrently to demand and to refuse a discrete referent, “Aschenglorie”, accommodates inside itself the twin and contradictory (and “unattainable” and “dialectal”) imperatives of the in-itself and the for-itself, the precise and the conceptual, the singular and the exemplary. Derrida’s essay reproduces that undecidability-at least theoretically- as a result of it adduces from Celan’s textual content material a poetics of witnessing dually, impossibly, undecidably, and dialectally obligated every to the singularity of what Celan’s witness has witnessed and to the exemplarity of that act of bearing witness.
The ultimate traces of Celan’s poem are “No person / bears witness for the / witness.”(201) Paul Celan was a Holocaust survivor and every his mom and father died by the arms of the Germans. All by way of his life Celan felt compelled to behave as a poetic witness to the Holocaust and Derrida rightly components out this exercise is in itself unattainable. He substantiates this with- “»¿That comes all the best way all the way down to saying – always the similar paradox, the similar paradoxopoetic matrix – that as rapidly as it is assured, certain as a theoretical proof , a sworn assertion cannot be assured as testimony.” 
Derrida repeatedly cited Celan’s putting phrase, “No particular person bears witness for the witness”. One sees the strain of what this means. The witness I bear, the testimony I give, shall be given solely by me alone. I alone can bear witness for what I witnessed. Witnessing is totally specific particular person, sui generis, distinctive, private, singular. Derrida attracts an extreme conclusion from this, particularly that that no act of testimony shall be verified. It is Derrida alone who’s conscious of that demand that arouses his respect and that he cannot and will not compromise. Nonetheless, as Derrida moreover reminds us, the phrase “testimony” comes from testis, from terstis, which suggests the third. The witness testifies as third to some transaction between as a minimum two others. Nonetheless he moreover reminds us that “one cannot and mustn’t (declare to) change the witness of his private demise, as an illustration any individual who perished inside the hell of Auschwitz.” Although Derrida agrees “there’s no witness for the witness” , he protests further on that “testimonies, will not ever, by definition, be proofs.